Executive Overview
The Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC) played a far more aggressive and foundational role in shaping federal college sports legislation than previously understood. Newly obtained public records, internal correspondence, and congressional lobbying disclosures reveal that ACC leadership did not merely offer public support for the controversial Protect College Sports Act (PCSA). Instead, conference officials operated as an active, behind-the-scenes legislative engine—reviewing draft text, soliciting and aggregating feedback from member institutions, organizing coordinated lobbying pushes, and conferring directly with key congressional offices to preserve provisions safeguarding their collective long-term viability.
The records, obtained from the University of North Carolina (UNC) and the University of Virginia (UVA) under public-records laws, lay bare the frantic legislative maneuvering that consumed the summer of 2026. As the NCAA and major conferences faced a string of costly legal defeats that dismantled traditional amateurism models, the PCSA emerged as their clearest path toward enforceable national rules.
For the ACC, however, the stakes were doubly high. While the conference publicly projected unity alongside the Big Ten and SEC, internal documents illustrate a complex web of competing institutional interests. Crucially, late-stage additions to the bill—specifically regarding Section 205 and its restrictive conference-movement framework—reveal how the legislative sausage-making directly impacted high-profile dissidents like Florida State and Clemson, effectively handcuffing their exit strategies and throwing a lifeline to the ACC’s television footprint.
Detailed Chronology of a Legislative Campaign
Early Summer Mobilization: June 2026
The ACC’s legislative apparatus was already operating at full throttle by early June. On June 5, ACC Commissioner Jim Phillips reported “extensive activity” surrounding the Cruz-Cantwell bill (the precursor to the PCSA), noting that he had formally dispatched a position letter to the primary sponsors, Senators Ted Cruz and Maria Cantwell.
By mid-June, conference machinery pivoted to technical provisions. On June 13, ACC officials instructed university presidents, athletic directors, and government relations personnel—including Florida State President Richard McCullough and Athletic Director Michael Alford—to prioritize preserving and strengthening enforcement language within the bill’s sports-gambling provisions. This directive was accompanied by an NCAA-forwarded email tying the provision directly to a high-profile legal challenge by Texas Tech quarterback Brendan Sorsby over gambling-related ineligibility.
Support was immediate from several corners. UNC Director of Athletics Bubba Cunningham responded:
"I am not sure what the best way to support this is, but it is our strong opinion that the gambling provision should remain in the bill. It is the one rule that everyone in college athletics understands. Let me know how I can help."
Kelly Dockham, UNC’s director of federal affairs, quickly volunteered to relay the recommendation directly to Senator Cruz’s committee staff.
The ACC as a Clearinghouse
Throughout late June, the ACC functioned as an administrative clearinghouse for member concerns regarding federal preemption and compliance. On June 24, UVA Deputy Athletics Director Jason Baum asked Chief Governance & Compliance Officer Brad Hostetter whether Section 125’s federal-law waiver would allow schools to adjust the number of sponsored sports, scholarships, and roster spots to comply with Title IX.
Hostetter replied that the conference hoped and believed that was the intent, noting that the question had been bundled into a broader list of inquiries directed to the bill’s sponsors. Days later, on June 29, Hostetter pressed ACC schools—including FSU’s Clay Ingram and Josh Duncan—to confirm whether formal letters of support had been dispatched to Senate offices, explaining that the headcount was required for upcoming discussions with Senator Cruz’s staff.
Washington Briefings and Diplomatic Pressures
By July, the campaign moved to Capitol Hill. On July 21, Commissioner Phillips abruptly canceled a scheduled ACC Board meeting, explaining in an email:
"We have been in constant contact with Senator Cruz’s and Senator Cantwell’s offices and were hoping to be able to share some new language with you regarding the PCSA, but there is not yet a markup of the bill to discuss."
The following day, Phillips and ACC Chief Legal Officer Pearlynn Houck participated in a standing-room-only briefing for more than 80 Republican Senate staffers. They also held private meetings with key legislators, including Senators Cruz, Cantwell, Eric Schmitt, and Alex Padilla.
In a July 23 briefing to ACC presidents and chancellors, Phillips detailed the discussions:
"Most of the discussion focused on more technical aspects of the bill, but there was mention for the first time that there was real consideration for the possibility of an increased cap to account for the inclusion of Associated Entity payments into the cap. We understand that is being pushed by some other conferences. We were able to dodge the question regarding the ACC’s official position, but today are getting draft language from those offices to react to along with the [SEC, Big Ten, and Big 12]."
"Pencils Are Down": The July 30 Deadline
The pressure campaign culminated dramatically on July 30. Shortly after midnight, Senate Commerce Committee Staff Director Brad Grantz emailed conference leaders what he termed the “last legislative draft and best-and-final offer.” Grantz noted that the text introduced a “different conference-movement framework” than an earlier proposal tied to private equity and a new league structure, though he declined to name the submitting institution.
With the directive “Pencils are down,” Grantz informed stakeholders that no further redlines, comments, or negotiations would be entertained. The legislation, crafted in close coordination with the White House and key stakeholders, was ready to move forward “if the B10 and SEC endorse.”
Twenty-five minutes later, Grantz circulated a replacement file to correct a formatting error in Section 205. He demanded that conferences and institutions answer two specific questions by 10:00 a.m. Eastern, instructing leaders to take votes among their university presidents if necessary.
At 8:20 a.m., Phillips transmitted the final text marked "Confidential – Protect College Sports Act" and "Confidential — Do Not Distribute Beyond Campus" to ACC presidents and chancellors, scheduling an emergency 4:00 p.m. meeting to formally determine the conference’s responses.
Supporting Context & Metrics: The Paid Lobbying Network
Federal lobbying disclosures highlight the unprecedented scale of the ACC’s legislative investment. The conference’s primary federal lobbying firm, DLA Piper, reported extensive activity throughout early 2026. While filings in the first quarter listed measures like the SCORE Act and the Student Athlete Fairness and Enforcement Act, second-quarter disclosures added the PCSA (S. 4668) directly to the docket.
ACC Federal Lobbying & Institutional Overlap (Q1-Q2 2026)
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Entity Primary Lobbying Firms Targeted Bills
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ACC Conference DLA Piper SCORE Act, SAFE Act, PCSA
Duke University DLA Piper PCSA (S. 4668)
UNC-Chapel Hill DLA Piper PCSA (S. 4668)
Wake Forest University DLA Piper PCSA (S. 4668)
Other ACC Members Internal / General Campus Filings General NIL / AppropriationsNotably, every ACC member institution reported at least $100,000 in federal lobbying expenditures during the first two quarters of 2026. Furthermore, individual schools supplemented direct campus efforts by retaining DLA Piper specifically for PCSA advocacy. Duke, North Carolina, and Wake Forest formally listed Senate Bill 4668 on their second-quarter disclosures.
Two prominent lobbyists anchored all four filings: former three-term North Carolina Senator Richard Burr and Michael Sorensen, a former Senate staffer under Burr. Sorensen’s name appeared repeatedly on internal ACC operational communications, bridging the gap between conference headquarters and Capitol Hill.
This level of synchronized, overlapping lobbying stood in stark contrast to other major conferences. While the Big Ten, SEC, and Big 12 retained various advisory firms, none exhibited the exact institutional overlap where multiple member schools shared the conference’s primary lobbying counsel specifically for the PCSA.
Official Statements and Internal Disconnects
Publicly, the ACC presented a united front. Commissioner Phillips reaffirmed the conference’s backing after the Big Ten and SEC issued endorsements, speaking unequivocally “as a league.”
Behind the scenes, however, consensus was more fragile. Reporting by Yahoo Sports revealed that the ACC never held a formal floor vote to approve its official stance on the PCSA. Instead, a small faction of member institutions expressed reservations, though the league remained overwhelmingly supportive of federal intervention.
Conference administrators carefully managed optics. On August 6—two days after the committee released revised text and one day prior to a crucial cloture vote—Brad Hostetter circulated updated section summaries and talking points at Phillips’ request. In his transmittal email, Hostetter explicitly noted:
"As you know, each institution is lobbying the bill as it deems appropriate and the talking points are provided simply as a resource."
When formally pressed by media outlets regarding whether the ACC Board voted on the Senate’s inquiries, whether any schools dissented, or how the conference authorized Phillips to speak on behalf of the league, the ACC issued a measured written response:
"The ACC has worked toward a national solution through federal legislation for several years, consistent with other Power Four conferences, and does not control or determine the specific language in the bill. Any feedback it gave was provided on behalf of the conference and its 18 member institutions, and each school has also been able to share feedback directly."
Future Outlook: The Impact of Section 205 on the ACC’s Future
The most explosive element of the finalized PCSA draft centered on Section 205. The provision replaced general references to independent schools with “covered” schools and placed strict limits on any “covered conference” reporting more than $700 million in annual revenue that sought to acquire another institution’s assets or media rights.
Under the final language, a high-revenue conference adding a school that did not qualify as a “covered institution” would be capped at 19 members. A covered institution was strictly defined as a school that had played football in a high-revenue covered conference at least once in the preceding five years. Consequently, any migrating program would be forced to spend five full years outside a high-revenue conference before another major league could safely absorb them without violating Section 205.
Implications for Florida State and Clemson
For restless ACC flagships like Florida State and Clemson, these restrictions represent a structural nightmare. FSU has spent years and millions of dollars attempting to unpick the conference’s ironclad Grant of Rights in pursuit of a lucrative exit by 2030.
However, Section 205 effectively neutralizes that leverage:
- The Big Ten Option Closed: The 19-member limit effectively removes the Big Ten as a viable landing spot, reserving its final potential slot for Notre Dame.
- The SEC Bottleneck: FSU is left in an "SEC-or-bust" dynamic.
- The Five-Year Penalty: The mandatory five-year independence requirement transforms any future exit strategy into a financially reckless limbo, rendering an early departure little more than an extended waiting period while the ACC’s media rights continue to bind them.
Despite these legal maneuvers, Florida State remains the ACC’s most potent television asset. The Seminoles’ season opener against New Mexico State set viewership records for the CW Network, and a subsequent Labor Day clash against SMU drew over 4 million viewers despite severe weather delays.
By locking down the membership framework, Section 205 strengthens the ACC’s long-term viability as a premier broadcast property—even if it comes at the direct expense of its most ambitious brands. While Florida Senator Ashley Moody subsequently proposed an amendment to shield schools from the five-year look-back if they withdrew within 180 days of enactment, the overarching framework of the PCSA demonstrates how the legislative process was leveraged to preserve the status quo.
Ultimately, the documents expose a sobering reality of modern collegiate athletics: when traditional collegiate models began to crumble under the weight of antitrust lawsuits and name, image, and likeness (NIL) deregulation, the conference offices did not simply adapt to the new political landscape—they actively built it.
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